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Abstract—Security countermeasures help ensure information
security: confidentiality, integrity and availability(CIA), by mit-
igating possible risks associated with the security event. Due to
the fact, that it is often difficult to measure such an impact
quantitatively, it is also difficult to deploy appropriate security
countermeasures. In this paper, we demonstrate a model of
quantitative risk analysis, where an optimisation routine is
developed to help a human decision maker to determine the
preferred trade-off between investment cost and resulting risk.
An offline optimisation routine deploys a genetic algorithm to
search for the best countermeasure combination, while multiple
risk factors are considered. We conduct an experimentation with
real world data, taken from the PTA(Practical Threat Analysis)
case study to show that our method is capable of delivering
solutions for real world problem data sets. The results show that
the multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) approach provides
high quality solutions, resulting in better knowledge for decision
making.
Index Terms—IT security; Genetic algorithm; Risk optimisa-
tion; Countermeasure selection problem; Decision Making;
I. INTRODUCTION
Assuring a secure IT environment has become a major
concern for decision makers, due to evolving complexity of
networked systems and high number of vulnerabilities and
threats. For instance, according to recent surveys undertaken
in 2010, around 71% of UK organisations suffered at least
one data breach in 2009 and 44% suffered between 2 and 5
breaches [1]. Globally, 88% of organisations have reported
at least one data breach, which is up 3% from 2009 [2].
In fact, a high number of reported breaches is usually a
good indicator that organisations have some issues with their
deployed security strategies.
Risk assessment is a well understood and widely accepted
ontology among decision makers, who is seeking to assure a
security of corporate IT infrastructures. A number of models
have been proposed to facilitate in security countermeasure
selection, however, the lack of relationship among risk related
factors, leads to poor and unbalanced security [3]–[5]. Often
risk is expressed by measuring Annual Loss Expectancy
(ALE), which is calculated by summing up the impact of out-
comes in monetary units and frequency of such outcomes [6].
Further, this metric was incorporated into cost-benefit analyses
to calculate Return-on-Investment (ROI) [7], [8]. Recently, risk
was expressed as the product of threat occurrences and their
resultant losses in US dollars, per event [9].
R =
∑
i
Ei ∗ Li(C) (1)
where R is risk in US dollars per year, i index representing
threats, Ei expected number of security events of type i per
year and Li(C) expected US dollar loss caused by security
event given the current set of countermeasures C.
Thus, the risk assessment often involves a calculation of
risk in relation to financial returns, rather than defined as
risk of possible losses related to degradation of information
security. Information security is commonly referred to as
CIA (Confidentiality Integrity Availability) [10]. One of the
first publications, where risk was associated with the impact
on CIA, nevertheless only by the theoretical means, was
Risk management guide for IT systems (NIST SP800-30)
[11]. Hence, in this paper we demonstrate a novel approach
of selecting security countermeasures with respect to both,
investment cost and risk of possible degradation of CIA. Nev-
ertheless, in this paper we provided only a basic description
of the model and concentrate on a problem solving method
used to support effective decision making, rather than on the
model itself. A detailed analysis of the model and overall risk
assessment framework can be found in [12].
The paper is organised as follows. In section II a defini-
tion of multi-objective optimisation is provided. Section III
presents the mathematical model of the countermeasure se-
lection problem, where a multi-objective function minimising
cost and risk is systematically formulated. Section IV describes
a developed multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) as a
technique to solved a problem formulated, followed by the
experiment and discussion of the results of a real world case
study data in Section V. Finally the conclusion is drawn in
Section VI.
II. MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMISATION
Most of the real world problems involve many objectives,
often conflicting ones. Due to this conflicting nature a simple
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single objective value comparison cannot be used when a
comparison of two and more feasible solutions to the problem
is desired. Most multi-objective algorithms deploys a concept
of dominance to perform such comparison in the multi-
objective environment.
The defined optimisation problem has two objectives, with-
out loss of generality, both to be minimised. The solution to
this problem can be described in terms of a decision vector
(S1, S2, ...Sk) in the decision space. A function f : S → X ,
X ⊆ Rk and k > 1 evaluates the quality of a specific solution
by assigning an objective vector to it.
In a minimisation problem, where S and S′ are two feasible
solutions, and X is a decision space, i.e., S, S′ ∈ X , the
solution S strictly dominates or is preferred to a solution S′
if each objective function value fp(S) is no greater that the
corresponding objective function value fp(S′), where p is an
objective 1 ≤ p ≤ P ,and at least one objective function value
is strictly less : fp(S) ≤ fp(S′)∀p and fp(S) < fp(S′)∃p.
A concept of dominance is crucial for the minimisation
problem demonstrated in this paper. A solution which effec-
tively reduces one of the objectives will adversely increase
the other objective. Thus, a trade-off between these two
conflicting objectives can expand the knowledge of a human
decision maker on possible investments and resulting risks
while selecting a set of countermeasures.
III. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM
In general, security solutions can be classified based on the
function they provide. Security solutions from one category
have the unique ability to address a particular vulnerability.
However, some solution from within the same category may
differ from each other by technical specifications and market
costs. On the whole, the classification simplifies the processes
of evaluation and selection of security countermeasures.
Let each security countermeasure be represented as a single
bit in the security countermeasure vector:
~S = {Sl} = {0, 1} ∀l, l = 1, 2, ..., k. (2)
where Sl represents an individual security countermeasure.
The value 1 indicates that this countermeasure is applied to
the information system and otherwise 0.
The selection of security countermeasures is performed by
first matching them to identified vulnerabilities.
Definition: A vulnerability is a weakness or flaw in system
security procedures, design or internal, management controls
that can be accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited,
resulting in a loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability.
Let each vulnerability be represented as a single bit in the
vulnerability vector:
~V = {Vi} = {1, 0} ∀i, i = 1, 2, ..., n. (3)
where Vi represents an individual vulnerability. The value 1
indicates the presence of this vulnerability in the information
systems, otherwise 0.
According to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS), there are three impact on CIA levels: partial (P),
complete (C) and none (N) [13]. The highest impact corre-
sponds to the CCC combination, standing for complete impact
on confidentiality, integrity and availability. For every CVE
numbered vulnerability, such a combination of impacts can be
retrieved from the National Vulnerability Database [14].
Let an impact introduced by a vulnerability be defined as Ii.
Considering different PCN combinations and an impact scale
taken from [11], the impact is classified as following:
Ii =


Low(10) when CIA ∈ {NNP, NPN, PNN};
Medium(50) when CIA ∈ {PPN, PNP, NPP, PPP,
NNC, NCN, CNN};
High(100) when CIA ∈ {PPC, PCP, CPP, NCC,
CNC, CCN, PCC,CPC, CCP, CCC};
Vulnerabilities, technical or nontechnical, can be identified
in four ways: using automated vulnerability scanning tools,
performing penetration testing, using modelling techniques
to predict nontechnical system weaknesses and by assessing
previous risk assessment documentation of the IT system.
Once the vulnerabilities are characterized, identification of
threats that can exploit them should be carried out.
Definition: A threat is a potential cause of an unwanted
event, in which a specific vulnerability is triggered or inten-
tionally exploited.
Humans should be considered as potentially dangerous
threat sources, who through intentional or unintentional acts
can carry out an attack. Intentional acts, such as an attempt to
get unauthorised access,e.g., via a password guessing, or an
attempt to circumvent the IT security, can be performed by
disgruntled employees, malicious persons. Whether uninten-
tional acts are initiated through negligence and errors [11].
A motivation in performing such acts should be carefully
assessed as well as methods by which humans might carry out
such an act. In addition, security violation reports, incident
reports, history of system break-ins should be reviewed by
a decision makers. Such informational sources will help to
gather potential threat source data that may be a concern,
where a vulnerability exists. Nevertheless, a list of threats
should be tailored to individual organisations and be business
oriented.
Let each threat be represented as a single bit in the threat
vector:
~T = {Tj} = {0, 1} ∀j, j = 1, 2, ...,m. (4)
where Tj represents an individual threat. The value 1 indicates
the presence of this threat in the information systems and
otherwise 0.
The likelihood Lji of a threat Tj acting over a vulnerability
Vi is defined as Lji = 〈Tj, Vi, 〉 and it can adopt one of three
values: 0.1, 0.5 and 1, where the value 0.1 represents low
likelihood, 0.5 - medium likelihood and 1 - high likelihood
[11]. If a threat Tj has no effect on a vulnerability Vi, there
is no risk and thus Lji = 0.
Definition: Total Initial Risk (TIR) is the sum of initial risks
in an organisation, when no security countermeasures have
been applied.
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TIR can be computed as follows:
TIR =
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Lij · Ii · Vi, (5)
where TIR ∈ R+, and Lji, Ii, Vi are derived during the risk
assessment analysis.
The value TIR indicates the total value of risk over all
identified threats, vulnerabilities and resulting impacts on CIA.
The purpose then is to reduce this value by selecting a set of
security countermeasures.
In order to select appropriate security measures which
would reduce the TIR value, a matching metric has been used,
defined as zli. Previously countermeasure-to-vulnerability
matching idea has been proposed in [15] and later demon-
strated in [16], where a matching value is assigned based
on an analysis, if a countermeasure can directly address or
indirectly address one or more vulnerabilities, indirectly create
some vulnerability or directly create some vulnerability.
In general, zli values should be assigned based on the
characteristics of a countermeasure and its match with the
vulnerability match. Each countermeasure-vulnerability com-
bination zli may have one of the five possible consequences:
zli =


1 if Sl directly addresses Vi;
0.5 if Sl indirectly addresses Vi;
0 if Sl and Vi do not match;
−0.5 if Sl indirectly creates Vi;
−1 if Sl directly creates Vi.
zli matching values can be derived through questionnaires
and workshops with people from various parts of the or-
ganisation such as information security experts, information
technology managers and staff, business asset owners and
users, and senior managers. In other cases, zli values can
be obtained from the National Vulnerability Database(NVD)
[14]. However, sources such as data breach reports, security
practices and guidelines [17], [18] can be used for some
countermeasure categories to deliver concise data about which
vulnerabilities can be directly or indirectly created, or ad-
dressed, while a security countermeasure is implemented.
Another factor, that should be considered during a security
countermeasure selection, is an investment cost. Suppose that
each of the listed countermeasures has an associated cost Cl.
The overall cost for a particular security countermeasure Sl
is the sum of the four presented sub-costs (operational, man
power, purchase and training) defined in monetary units, i.e.,
Cl =
4∑
n=1
Cln (6)
Definition: Total Cost (TC)
Given a set of k security measures, each having a cost
Cl, 1 ≤ l ≤ k and considering a vector of ~S = (Sl),
Sl ∈ {0, 1}∀ l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, the total cost TC is defined as:
TC(~S) =
{
k∑
l=1
ClSl : Cl > 0, ∀l (Cl)
}
(7)
Sl =
{
1 if a security measure l is selected in the solution;
0 otherwise.
The objective two, corresponding to the risk R(~S) is further
defined as:
Definition: Risk (R)
Given a total initial risk TIR, a vector ~S = (Sl), Sl ∈
{0, 1}∀ l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k and a matching matrix zli , zli =
〈Sl, Vi〉, the risk R is formulated as:
R(~S) =

TIR−
k∑
l=1
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Lji · Ii · zli · Sl

 (8)
Definition: Multi-objective Countermeasure Selection
Problem
Given a vector of k countermeasures ~S = (S1, S2, ...Sk)
defined on a finite set X of feasible solutions, and two
objectives, total cost TC and risk R, consider the multi-
objective combinatorial optimisation problem:
min f(~S) = [TC,R] (9)
subject to ~S ∈ X
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE MULTI-OBJECTIVE GENETIC
ALGORITHM
A Genetic Algorithm (GA) is type of metaheuristic which
is used to seek for a global optimal solution in complex
multi-dimensional search spaces [19]. Although GA does not
guarantee to find an optimality, it has been widely deployed
for solving complex multi-objective optimisation problems, in
particular it is a popular technique to solve combinatorial
problems [9], [20], [21] because of its efficiency in terms
of convergence and diversity of solutions. GA works with
the population of candidate solutions, trying to converge
towards the Pareto-optimal set by removing the infeasible and
dominated ones.
The proposed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. A search
starts by initiating a population pop of randomly generated
security control vectors ~S, or chromosomes, each of them
represents one potential solution to the problem. For each
solution the total cost TC and risk R are calculated, following
Eq. 7 and Eq. 8. A generation index gen keeps track of
the number of iterations of the MOGA. Each generation
proceeds as follows: an offspring population Poff is first
created from the parent population Parpop with the help
of genetic operators: selection, mutation and crossover. The
objective functions’ values corresponding to each solution
in the offspring population are also computed. The parent
and offspring populations are then combined to form a new
population newpop. A non-dominated sorting is then applied
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to rank each solution in the population. The population then is
generated by selecting fittest solutions. Maintaining diversity
within the population is important in order to obtain uniformly
distributed solutions over the entire Pareto Front. We imple-
ment a scattered crossover function among two parents, each
gene has an equal chance of coming from either parent to
create children. Mutation, which occurs with a probability of
0.01, is used to provide a genetic diversity and to broaden the
space, by randomly selecting and swapping two genes.
Algorithm 1: Multi-objective Genetic Algorithm
gen = 0;
pop = ~S; {Initialise a population}
Parpop = Poff ; {Set a parent population of size P}
while gen < genmax do
fc(~S); fr(~S); {Evaluate objective values of each individual}
sort Parpop {Sort the population based on the non-domination}
Selection {Use the selection function}
Crossover {Use the crossover operator}
Mutation {Use the mutation function}
newpop = Parpop + ofsprpop;
sort newpop; {Sort an extended population based on
non-domination}
newpop = bestpop;
gen = gen + 1;
end while
The algorithm parameters are set as follows: population size
= 100, number of generations = 100, crossover probability =
0.85 and mutation probability = 0.01. We ran an algorithm for
five times to check for any sensitivity in solutions obtained
from different initial population. Since the final solutions
converged to the same optima, we excluded the presence of
such sensitivity.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the procedure
for determining a set of countermeasures considering multiple
objectives: cost and risk. The data used in the experiment
has been taken from the Practical Threat Analysis (PTA)
tool, which contains a database of case studies performed,
real life examples and threat models, as well as published
case study documents, which can be found in [22]. PTA is
a calculative threat modelling methodology that is used to
facilitate in assessing operational and security risks and help
in defining the most appropriate risk mitigation policy. The
methodology can be summarised as follows: identify system
vulnerabilities, map system assets, asses the risk of the threats
and define the risk mitigation plan for the analysed system
architecture and configuration. The final risk mitigation plan
proposed by the threat modelling methodology is composed of
the countermeasures that are cost-effective against identified
threats.
A. Internal Threat Case Study
A sample data has been retrieved from [23] where a case
study on the performed internal threat analysis has been
published and an example model provided. The final result
proposed by the PTA threat model and a suite of software
tools, was a risk mitigation strategy, in particular it was
suggested to consider a three step mitigation strategy to reduce
the system’s risk in the most effective way. Notably our
purpose here is only to provide an illustrative example of our
procedure with the real case study data.
The first step was to define a list of vulnerabilities and
match them to the threats identified within the case study (See
Table I). Identified vulnerabilities posses some impact on CIA
if an identified threat will exploit a particular vulnerability.
The impact can be obtained from a number of e-sources by
providing a CVE number. Table II is derived from the [14].
The cost as well as a list of proposed countermeasures are
summarised in Table III.
TABLE I
CASE STUDY: DATA HOW THREATS MATCH VULNERABILITIES
Threat Threats/ Repr. Matched
sources Actions vulnerability
Web User Malicious Insider connects to internal T1 V2 ,V3, V8 ,V9
databases/file system in order to
access/modify sensitive data
Malicious hacker connects to internal T2 V1 ,V5 ,V9
databases/file system in order to
access/modify sensitive data
Hacker Hacker uses HTTP requests T3 V1 ,V9
to get access to OS resources of
the Web Server
Insider Insider may leak sensitive T4 V4 ,V8,V6,V7
information over the Web
Employees are tempted T5 V5 ,V6
to download music/
share files/Google chat/
for personal ends
In order to calculate risk, several calculations should be
carried out, following Eq. 5. Additional step that had to be
made is to construct a matching matrix zli, taking sample data
as well as additional sources, such as [14], [17], [18].
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Fig. 1. Non dominated and efficient solutions
In order to ensure that an algorithm is capable of finding
optimal solutions or good enough to be considered as viable,
we have run an Exhaustive Search (ES). ES is considered as
an only algorithm capable of finding all optimal solutions,
by performing a full enumeration of solutions. Fig.1 provides
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TABLE II
CASE STUDY: DATA ABOUT VULNERABILITIES AND CORRESPONDING CVE, IMPACT INFORMATION
Representation Vulnerability CVE number Impact
(Repr.) on CIA
V1 Unspecified vulnerability in Microsoft IIS 6.0 2010-1256 CCC
V2 Unauthorised data mofification 2006-0722 NPN
V3 Insiders can execute arbitrary commands 2004-2687 CCC
V4 Administrator password disclosure 2006-0561 CCC
V5 Rogue protocols/tunnels 2010-4528 NNP
V6 Traffic is not filltered properly in SNORT 2008-1804 PPP
V7 Workstation security configuration flaws 2004-2680 PNN
V8 FTP/HTTP file sharing 2006-3952 PPP
V9 Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities 2005-1503 PPP
TABLE III
CASE STUDY: DATA ABOUT COUNTERMEASURES
Repr. Countermeasure Mitigated Vulnerabilities Total Cost
S1 Database login accounts should be given the minimal V2 , V3 ,V 4 ,V 7 9.500
rights that are necessary for their functionality
S2 Enforce policy of downloading and deployment V1 10.000
of latest security patches for OS, database and Web server
S3 SDLC, Enforce security code review V2 , V9 100.000
S4 AUP, Establish procedure and enforce for insider disclosures V3 75.000
S5 Alert on Web postings V4 38.000
S6 Alert on transfer of structured data from enterprise mgmt/design databases V3 ,V4 ,V7 76.000
S7 Monitor AUP violations V4 ,V5 ,V7 76.000
S8 Detect unauthorized non-proxied end points V6 76.000
S9 Monitor unusual file transfer V8 38.000
the result obtained by the MOGA in comparison to ES. As
it can be seen, MOGA has obtained the same solutions to
the ES. However, in terms of speed GA outperformed ES, in
particular, it took less than a second for GA to obtain a Pareto
set, whether for ES it took 15s. It should be noted, that when
the size of the problem would be higher than the one analysed
in this example, ES time would exponentially increase with the
problem size.
Table IV summarises 13 possible sets of security coun-
termeasures, as most effective ones to reduce threats at a
corresponding cost. As it can be seen, the number of selected
countermeasures within a set reaches even 6 countermeasures,
depending upon the maximum budget a decision maker will
consider.
TABLE IV
CASE STUDY: OBTAINED SOLUTIONS AND CORRESPONDING
COUNTERMEASURES
Nr Solution Countermeasures selected
1 000000000 None
2 100000000 S1
3 100000100 S1 and S7
4 100010000 S1 and S5
5 100010100 S1,S5 and S7
6 100010101 S1,S5,S7 and S9
7 100011100 S1,S5, S6 and S7
8 100011101 S1,S5, S6,S7 and S9
9 101000100 S1, S3 and S7
10 101010100 S1, S3 and S7
11 101010101 S1,S3,S5,S7 and S9
12 101011100 S1,S3,S5,S6 and S7
13 101011101 S1,S3,S5,S6,S7 and S9
VI. CONCLUSION
Security planning involves an ongoing risk assessment pro-
cess and implementation of the most effective countermeasures
which would reduce the threats and risks. As discussed, mea-
suring risk in relation to the impact vulnerabilities introduce,
is difficult. The main novelty of this paper is to demonstrate
a decision support strategy when a selection of security
countermeasures to be performed considering reduced risk and
cost. A risk is formulated considering an impact of a security
breach event (threat-to-vulnerability match) and degradation of
CIA. A structured formulation of the multi-objective problem
has been provided in this paper, however, the complete model
can be found in [12]. To facilitate a fast and reliable search
of possible countermeasure combinations, a multi-objective
genetic algorithm (MOGA) has been developed and discussed.
MOGA was used as an optimisation technique capable of
finding optimal solutions and deriving a Pareto Set.
An example provided in the paper was based on the real data
provided by the PTA. The result of the optimisation routine
was a set of solutions, which upon the final decision, can
be deployed to reduce the risk and meet a specified budget.
Compared to full enumeration method, GA has demonstrated
a great performance, in terms of speed and quality of solu-
tions selected. Therefore, it can be considered as one of the
optimisation approaches capable of dealing with a real world
countermeasure selection problem.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Maple and A. Phillips, “UK Security Breach Investigations Report,”
7Safe, 2010.
[2] Ponemon, “Annual Study: U.K. Enterprise Encryption Trends,” Ponemon
Institute, Tech. Rep., July 2010.
[3] T. Neubauer, A. Ekelhart, and S. Fenz, “Interactive selection of iso 27001
controls under multiple objectives,” in SEC, 2008, pp. 477–492.
[4] A. Revol. (2010) Is Your IT Strategy Optimized for Risk
Management. Accessed before 2011.06.13. [Online]. Available:
http://www.adrien-revol.com/
[5] A. Ekelhart, S. Fenz, M. Klemen, and E. Weippl, “Security ontologies:
Improving quantitative risk analysis,” in 40th Annual Hawaii Interna-
tional Conference on System Sciences, January 2007.
466
[6] K. J. Soo Hoo, “How much is enough: a risk management approach
to computer security,” Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford, CA, USA, 2000,
AAI9986202.
[7] S. Bistarelli, F. Fioravanti, and P. Peretti, “Defense trees for economic
evaluation of security investments,” in ARES, 2006, pp. 416–423.
[8] A. Arora, D. Hall, C. A. Pinto, D. Ramsey, and R. Telang, “Measuring
the risk-based value of it security solutions,” IT Professional, vol. 6,
no. 6, pp. 35–42, 2004.
[9] L. P. Rees, J. K. Deane, T. R. Rakes, and W. H. Baker, “Decision support
for cybersecurity risk planning,” Decision Support Systems, vol. 51,
no. 3, pp. 493–505, 2011.
[10] T. Neubauer and C. Hartl, “On the singularity of valuating IT security
investments,” in ACIS-ICIS, 2009, pp. 549–556.
[11] Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems: SP 800-
30. Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology., NIST Std., November 2002.
[12] V. Viduto, C. Maple, W. Huang, and D. Lopez-Perez, “A novel risk
assessment and optimisation model for a multi-objective network se-
curity countermeasure selection problem,” Accepted for publication in
Decision Support Systems, 2012.
[13] P. Mell, K. Scarfone, and S. Romanosky, “A complete guide to the
common vulnerability scoring system version 2.0,” Tech. Rep., 2007.
[14] NIST, “National vulnerability database, automating vulnerability man-
agement, security measurement and compliance cheking,” http://nvd.nist.
gov/home.cfm, Accessed before 1st of December 2011.
[15] R. Anderson, P. Feldman, S. Gerwehr, B. Houghton, R. Mesic, J. Pinder,
J. Rothenberg, and J. Chiesa, Securing the U.S. Defense Information
Infrastructure: A Proposed Approach. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.
[16] M. Gupta, J. Rees, A. Chaturvedi, and J. Chi, “Matching information
security vulnerabilities to organizational security profiles: a genetic
algorithm approach,” Decis. Support Syst., vol. 41, pp. 592–603, March
2006.
[17] M.Templeman, M. Beishon, L. Malachowski, A.Wilson, T. Nash, and
L. Robertson, “Information security - best practice measures for pro-
tecting your business,” Department of Trade and Industry, Tech. Rep.,
2005.
[18] US-CERT, “Introduction to recommended practices,” http://www.
us-cert.gov/control\ systems/practices/, Accessed before 1st of April
2011.
[19] J. Holland, Adaptation in natural and artificial systems. University of
Michigan Press, 1975.
[20] A. Jaszkiewicz, “Genetic local search for multi-objective combinatorial
optimization,” European Journal Of Operational Research, vol. 137,
no. 1, pp. 50–71, 2002.
[21] F. Neumann, C. Witt, F. Neumann, and C. Witt, ser. Natural Computing
Series. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
[22] PTA Technologies. (2010) Practical Threat Analysis for Information
Security Experts. Accessed before 2011.06.06. [Online]. Available:
http://www.ptatechnologies.com/default.htm
[23] PTA. (2010) Mitigating Internal Threats with PTA. Accessed
before 22nd of December 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.
ptatechnologies.com/default.htm
467
